Friday 18 November 2016

Trump and nuclear proliferation: ‘The importance of this issue to our security is clear'

Trump calls into question what has been a bipartisan policy in the US for the last 70 years: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un
‘When analysing Trump’s numerous comments on nuclear deterrence and proliferation over the course of the campaign, it’s difficult to assemble much coherence.’ Photograph: Ahn Young-joon/AP

One of President-elect Trump’s first tweets in the days after winning the election was in reference to his controversial comments on nuclear proliferation.
“The @nytimes states today that DJT believes ‘more countries should acquire nuclear weapons.’ How dishonest are they. I never said this!”
For nuclear-policy specialists, watching nuclear assurance occur on Twitter is a new one.
But the problem, of course, is that he has said this. In fact, he said it multiple different times during the campaign. Moreover, in the world of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation where often the role of the United States has been to assure its allies that it remains committed to their defence as well as to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation, words matter.
Leaders in South Korea, with one eye on a pugnacious and nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un, have very likely been paying close attention. And if under a Trump presidency America’s policy towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons weakened, it would have deep and wide ramifications for our region and Australia’s security.
At a town hall earlier this year in Wisconsin, then Republican candidate Donald Trump was asked for his thoughts on nuclear proliferation.
“You have so many countries already – China, Pakistan, you have so many countries, Russia – you have so many countries right now that have them …. Wouldn’t you rather, in a certain sense, have Japan have nuclear weapons when North Korea has nuclear weapons?”
With that statement, Trump called into question what has been a bipartisan policy in the United States for the better part of the last 70 years: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Now, when analysing Trump’s numerous comments on nuclear deterrence and proliferation over the course of the campaign, it’s difficult to assemble much coherence.
Aside from the above, in the same interview Trump also said “No, no, not proliferation. I hate nuclear more than any ... I don’t want more nuclear weapons.” A week later when pressed to clarify whether he believes there is a nuclear arms race on the Korean Peninsula, Trump doubled down.
“Maybe they would, in fact, be better off if they defend themselves from North Korea ... including with nukes, yes, including with nukes.”
This has raised the question of Trump’s commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which came into force in 1970 and has undoubtedly been a pillar of geopolitical stability.
The treaty has provided international norms, civilian nuclear energy and verification for the vast majority of countries in the world that have signed on.
Yet the treaty does have its problems. It hasn’t been able to prevent all proliferation. Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea all sit outside the treaty and all have been able to develop their own nuclear weapons. There is also growing frustration about the slow disarmament efforts of nuclear armed states like the United States and Russia.
Recently, 123 countries voted at the United Nations to begin negotiations on a global treaty to ban nuclear weapons. Nuclear-armed states, along with many of those under their nuclear umbrella like Australia, voted against it.
This being said we are a long way from 1960 when John F. Kennedy, during another US election, said that because of the spread of nuclear technology that “10, 15 or 20 will have a nuclear capacity ... by the end of the Presidential office in 1964.”
However the balance achieved by the treaty has always been delicate, including in Asia. A combination of US military forces in the region and the extension of the US nuclear umbrella to allies like South Korea and Japan, has given ample reason for those countries not to pursue their own arsenals.
This is particularly true for Seoul. With North Korea’s steady march towards a more capable nuclear arsenal, popular opinion in South Korea has grown in favour of a domestic deterrent. Earlier this year, polls ranged from 52.2% to 67.7% in favour of South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons.
Politicians in Seoul have also begun to air this possibility. “We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbour whenever it rains,” said Won Yoo-chul, a senior South Korean parliamentarian in February, “we must be prepared and wear our own raincoat.”
Japan also has one of the most advanced nuclear energy sectors in the world and certainly has enough plutonium on hand to construct an arsenal rather quickly if it chose to. It’s less likely than South Korea due to historical, social, cultural and political factors. But the potential is there.
President-elect Trump’s comments during the election will have already emboldened voices across the region that are in favour of relying on nuclear weapons for their own security. Regardless if Trump walks back his stance on the issue, the ability of Washington to assure its allies has been damaged in the nuclear realm.
The importance of this issue to Australia’s security is clear. A region where the United States steps away from its role in maintaining the nuclear status-quo would be fundamentally insecure for us all.
In the coming months when Australian diplomats are attempting to focus the new Trump administration on Asia and lining up our own interests, non-proliferation needs to be at the top of the agenda.

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