Sunday 3 January 2016

Celebrate the victories, but plan for a post-IS Iraq

Extract from ABC 'The Drum'

Opinion
Updated Tue at 9:31am

Iraqi soldier signs "V" for victory

There have been even more victories against Islamic State in Iraq, but the greatest challenge facing the country may be uniting all the assembled anti-IS forces once their common enemy is contained, writes Daryl McCann.

A victory is a victory and the end of Islamic State rule in Ramadi, capital of Iraq's mainly Sunni province of Anbar, constitutes good news.
Not so long ago the Iraqi Armed Forces were considered a lost cause but now, with more than a little help from the United States Air Force, they are back in the fight.
Some of the fleeing 500 Islamic State (IS) fighters will relocate to Mosul for a final showdown in Iraq; others might find themselves ordered to the other side of the Syrian border. However, the possibility - if it ever existed - that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's millennialist death cult might one day lay siege to Baghdad, 90 kilometres to the east, now seems unlikely.

Key points:

  • Iraq's military says IS fighters have withdrawn from the government compound
  • The complex must be cleared of explosives, planted by IS, before troops can enter
  • Reports IS used civilians as shields to escape
  • Jihadists are thought to have regrouped east of Ramadi
The momentum is no longer on the side of the IS. The fall of Sinjar in November and the porous security in the IS-held town of Hawija in Kirkuk province is only the half of it. This year also saw the IS group's militia vanquished across northern-eastern Syria, from Kobane (January 2015) and Tal Abyad (June 2015) to Al-Hawl (November 2015).
Success continues apace. The Kurdish-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, as I write, are enjoying their own victory on the Euphrates River against IS, although in a very different part of Mesopotamia from Ramadi.
By the year's end, according to the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the IS "caliphate" will have lost 14 per cent of the territory it held (in Iraq and Syria) on January 1, 2015, much of that due to the Syrian Kurds. We are talking of 12,800 square kilometres gone.
Even Supreme Leader Al Baghdadi has, over the past day or so, spoken publicly of what we might call an annus horribilis: "As part of our destiny, we lost many jihadists in recent fights ... but the rest must continue to fight to the bitter end." Joseph Goebbels could not have said it better in a strangely familiar context.

Explained: The battle for Ramadi



None of this is to underestimate the challenge ahead in eradicating the armed forces of IS and also its violent apocalyptic creed. On the political front there is always something going awry. For instance, the sectarianism of ex-prime minister Nour al-Maliki (2006-14) drove a wedge between the minority Sunni population and the Shia-dominated government agencies of the Republic of Iraq.
Hubris does not adequately describe Nour al-Maliki's mistreatment of the veterans of Anbar's Sunni "Awakening" (al-Sahawat) who played a key role in seeing off Al Qaeda in Iraq by the end of 2007. The authorities in Baghdad, during the subsequent years, treated the people of Ramadi - mostly populated by Sunni Dulaim tribe - and their political representatives with disregard.
A quick recall of the events preceding the triumphant arrival of IS on the scene in December 2013 proves enlightening. If the anti-IS political forces in Iraq cannot formulate an effective modus operandi then history will continue to be one step forward and two steps back.
The current prime minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, hails from the same political party as his predecessor, the Islamic Dawa Party. Even so, the present incumbent cuts a far less polarising figure - though that, of course, is not saying a lot.
The demographics of Iraq are no straightforward matter, but it is not inaccurate to speak of the three dominant groups and regions, the Kurds in the north (15-20 per cent of the total population), the Arab Sunni in the north-west (less than 20 per cent) and the majority Arab Shia (60 per cent or more) inhabiting the centre and the south of the country.
For the Republic of Iraq to flourish as a genuine nation-state it will, inevitably, have to reconfigure itself as a federation or even confederation. The great military trial ahead - the 2016 Battle of Mosul - could well serve as not only the final comeuppance for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's particular version of theocratic-fascism on Iraq soil, but also a turning point for Iraq - a heterogeneous entity, to be sure, but one that needs to live in peace with itself and not oppress other components of the whole; the late Saddam Hussein's barbarity towards the Kurds and the long-term suppression of the Shia population being two cases in point.
Islamic State's seizure of Mosul (population between 1 and 1.5 million) back on June 10, 2014, struck like an earthquake. A force of 1,300 lightly armed fighters routed the IAF in the most farcical of circumstances. The venerable Patrick Cockburn, writing for the Independent newspaper, caught some of the momentousness of the occasion.
From Mosul's Great Mosque, some three weeks later, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi introduced himself to world as "Caliph Ibrahim", founder of a new empire. Given the "industrial scale" atrocities committed by IS across eastern Syria and western Iraq, the prospect of a military victory by anti-IS forces next year in Mosul (and Nineveh province more generally) is something to relish as this year draws to a conclusion. A victory, after all, is a victory
Nevertheless, how the assembled anti-IS forces - from the Kurdish Peshmerga and the mostly Shia Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), to the IAF and sundry Sunni militia - choose to accommodate and co-operate with each other after the bloody deed is done might, as with the past, turn out to be more critical than the battle itself.

Daryl McCann writes regularly for Quadrant and the Salisbury Review. Visit his blog.

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